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Stock price synchronicity has been associated with various market outcomes like the 
return-sentiment relations, stock liquidity, and asset pricing models. Therefore, 
researchers have devoted a lot of time in revealing the underlying factors that drive 
stock price synchronicity. Using a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019 
we find a robust association between higher cultural secretiveness and stock price 
synchronicity. Our results suggest that a deep-rooted country characteristic like the 
culture of secrecy can diminish the information environment of stock markets. The 
results are robust to the use of various control variables suggested in earlier studies and 
alternative regression techniques, including ones that address endogeneity concerns.  
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The seminal work of Roll (1988) asserts that the extent to which stock prices move 
together depends on the relative degree of firm-specific and market-specific 
information that is incorporated into stock prices. This has generated a large volume of 
studies aiming to reveal those factors that drive stock price synchronicity.1,2 Some of 
them focus on firm-level characteristics like large controlling shareholders (Boubaker 
et al., 2014), social media coverage (Ding et al., 2020), analyst coverage (Chan and 
Hameed, 2006), trade credit (Liu and Hou, 2019), voluntary IFRS adoption (Kim and 
Shi, 2012), and discretionary accruals (Hutton et al., 2009). Others, focus on country-
level attributes like property rights (Morck et al., 2000), insider trading laws (Fernandes 
and Ferreira, 2009), political uncertainty (Doan et al., 2020), the extent of the freedom 
of the press (Kim et al., 2014), and the extent of financial disclosures and auditors’ 
availability (Jin and Myers, 2006).  
The present study aims to extend the literature by exploring whether and how a 
national culture of secrecy explains differences in stock price synchronicity across 
countries. This interest in secretiveness is driven by the underlying idea in all the above 
studies, asserting that the aforementioned firm-specific and country-specific 
characteristics influence stock synchronicity because of the associated opacity of the 
financial statements, the cost of information collection, and the dissemination of 
information in the market.  
 
1 Synchronicity is as an inverse measure of informative stock prices in which higher (lower) 
synchronicity refers to less (more) informative stock prices.  
2 Understanding the driving factors of this phenomenon is important for both academics and practitioners 
because synchronicity has been associated with various outcomes like the return-sentiment relations (Rao 
and Zhou, 2019), stock liquidity (Chan et al., 2013), changes in market-based measures of information-
based trading in response to analyst recommendation revisions (Devos et al., 2015), and asset pricing 




 Our approach is further motivated by a number of studies documenting an 
association between a national culture of secrecy and disclosure practices (Gray, 1988; 
Gray and Vint, 1995; Doupnki and Riccio, 2006), the decision to hire a Big 4 auditor 
(Hope et al., 2008), the probability to receive a modified audit opinion (Chen et al., 
2017), corporate investment efficiency (Mazboudi and Hasan, 2018), and bank-firm 
relationships (Pasiouras et al., 2020). Nonetheless, none of these studies deals with 
stock price synchronicity. At the same time, while there exist several studies on the 
association between formal institutions and stock price synchronicity, informal 
institutions like culture have received considerably less attention in the literature. In 
more detail, while Eun et al. (2015) focus on the impact of the cultural dimensions of 
tightness and individualism on stock price synchronicity, they do not explore the role 
of a culture of secretiveness.  
Another interesting aspect of our work is that the investigation of the culture of 
secrecy, which is a deep-rooted social characteristic that was formed years ago, allows 
us to address a point that was highlighted in Hasan et al. (2014), stating that: “a potential 
drawback of the cross country studies is that firms operating in different national 
environments are also affected by other country specific characteristics, such as 
diversity of historical experience” (p. 93).  
As in past studies, we adopt Gray’s (1988) conceptual framework which asserts 
that managers in societies with a secretive culture tend to be less transparent in their 
disclosure practices. In terms of our empirical analysis, we follow Hope et al. (2008) 
and other empirical studies (Chen et al., 2017;  Mazboudi and Hasan, 2018; Pasiouras 
et al., 2020) and we develop an overall index of national culture of secrecy that is based 
on three well-known indicators of national culture introduced by Hofstede (1980). 




national culture of secrecy and stock price synchronicity. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of numerous control variables, including other country-specific attributes that 
account for the dissemination of information in the economy like lack of press freedom 
and the strength of accounting and auditing standards.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion. 
Section 3 presents the empirical framework. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Background discussion 
2.1. Cross-country studies on stock price synchronicity  
There exists a good number of studies that attempt to shed light on the cross-country 
differences in stock price synchronicity.3 In an influential study, Morck et al. (2000) 
find that stock prices in economies with high per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
move in a relatively unsynchronized manner. However, the addition of a variable that 
measures government respect for private property, renders per capita GDP insignificant 
in explaining stock price synchronicity. Additionally, stronger protection of public 
shareholders' property rights against corporate insiders is associate with lower 
synchronicity in the case of developed economies. Therefore, Morck et al. (2000) 
conclude that the degree to which a country protects private property rights affects both 
the extent to which information is capitalized into stock prices and the sort of 
information that is capitalized.  
 
3 Further to the studies that we discuss in the main body of the manuscript, there are also some studies 
that focus on the banking sector (Francis et al., 2015; Doan et al., 2020). We do not discuss them in 
detail, due to the specific characteristics of the banking sector, and the fact that they are more specialized, 





A more recent study by Jin and Myers (2006) argues that poor protection without 
opaqueness is not enough to explain high R2s. Using stock returns from 40 stock 
markets from 1990 to 2001, their results confirm a strong positive association between 
R2 and several measures of an opaque operating environment, related to accounting 
transparency, auditing activity and analysts’ forecasts.4  
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) reveal the role of insider trading laws, by 
examining the relationship between a country’s first-time enforcement of such laws and 
stock price informativeness (lack of synchronicity) in 48 countries between 1980 and 
2003. They find that the enforcement of insider trading laws improves price 
informativeness in developed markets; however, in the case of emerging markets the 
enforcement of insider trading laws is associated with an insignificant change in firm-
specific return variation.  
Kim et al. (2014) focus on the ability of the press in a country to generate external 
transparency by the level of press freedom and the extent to which the press is free from 
state interference. Using a sample from 50 countries, they find a significant relationship 
between higher press freedom and lower stock price synchronicity, concluding that the 
freedom of the press can increase the information environment of stock markets. 
Thus, as discussed in Dang et al. (2020), the findings of existing studies suggest 
that when countries’ or firms’ environments are characterized by information opacity, 
stock prices fail to reflect firm-specific information in a timely and precise manner, and 
therefore tend to co-move with the market. Kim et al. (2014) point out that the 
 
4 In more detail, Jin and Myers (2006) consider the following indicators of opaqueness: (i) a survey based 
measured from the Global Competitiveness report, revealing the availability of information and the 
extent to which the financial disclosure requirements are extensive and detailed, (ii) a measure of auditing 
activity, (iii) an indicator of the extent of key accounting variables that are included in financial 
statements, (iv) an opaqueness measure from PricewaterhouseCoopers, that is based on a survey of 
CFOs, bankers, equity analysts and local PricewaterhouseCoopers consultants, and covers corruption in 
government, legal protection of property and contracts, macroeconomic policies, accounting standards 




underlying explanation for these results can be associated to two effects of transparency 
that they label the “information effect” and the “investor protection effect”. As it 
concerns the first effect, the underlying idea is that transparency makes firms more 
informative and thus enables stock prices to incorporate more firm-specific 
information. Turning to the second effect, the key argument is that transparency 
enhances investor protection. This encourages more outside and/or perspective 
investors to collect private firm-specific information before they trade and thus enables 
stock prices to incorporate more firm-specific information. 
The above discussion leads to the working hypothesis of the present study that the 
national culture of secretiveness, which results in a less transparent overall 
environment, will be positively associated with stock price synchronicity. In other 
words, we assert that culturally driven opacity limits the flow of firm-specific 
information to the market, which leads to higher return co-movement. As we discuss in 
the next section the national culture of secretiveness has been associated with 
accounting disclosures and auditing effectiveness. However, this may not be a 
necessary condition. In more detail, Jin and Myers (2006) approach opaqueness more 
broadly by asserting that it refers to the lack of information that would enable investors 
to observe operating cash flow and income and determine firm value. Thus, as they 
argue, value-relevant information, may not necessarily be the same thing as accounting 
detail, and they propose the use of a wider net and look for a range of proxies for 
opaqueness or transparency. Within this context, we believe that the culture of secrecy 
that is deep rooted and general indicator of the secretiveness in a society has several 






2.2. Studies on the culture of secrecy  
In his seminal work, Gray (1988) proposed a conceptual framework to establish a 
relationship between different national cultural dimensions and the development of 
accounting systems, the regulation of the accounting profession and attitudes towards 
financial management and disclosures. As it concerns secrecy (versus transparency) 
that is the focus of the present study, Gray (1988) defines this as “a preference for 
confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business only 
to those who are closely involved with hits management and financing as opposed to a 
more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach” (p. 8). His conceptual 
model, which we discuss in more detail in Section 3.1.2, predicts a close link between 
secrecy and the cultural dimensions of uncertainty-avoidance, power distance and 
individualism, with a less important link with the dimension of masculinity also being 
likely.  
Gray (1988) did not test empirically his theoretical model; however, follow-up 
empirical studies provide support to his arguments, documenting an association 
between the cultural dimensions identified in Gray’s framework and corporate 
disclosure behavior across the world (Eddie, 1990; Gray and Vint, 1995; Salter and 
Niswander, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996).  
More recent studies provide additional insights. For example, MacArthur 
(1999) investigates the effect of culture on the comment letters sent by accounting 
member bodies on the International Accounting Standards Committee’s exposure draft 
32, to conclude that the results strongly support the power distance, individualism, and 
strong uncertainty avoidance hypotheses. The likelihood of withholding material 
information about the firm, has led others to relate the culture of secrecy to auditing. 




and the likelihood to hire a big 4 auditor, and Chen et al. (2017) report a positive 
relationship between secrecy and the likelihood of issuing modified audit opinions.  
Mazboudi and Hasan (2018) extend the literature to consider the impact of 
secrecy on corporate investment efficiency. They argue that: (i) a lower level of 
corporate transparency reduces investors’ ability to monitor managerial investment 
decisions and (ii) managers are expected to be, ex ante, less disciplined in their 
investment behavior when they operate within an environment of high information 
asymmetry. Therefore, Mazboudi and Hasan (2018) hypothesize that information 
asymmetry problems in secretive societies will enhance corporate investment 
inefficiency. Their empirical findings are consistent with this hypothesis. Pasiouras et 
al. (2020) also build their hypothesis around information asymmetry, in their case 
related to the lender-borrower relationship. They propose that a culture of secretiveness 
may influence the willingness of a firm to release sensitive information to its lenders, 
with implications for the firm-bank relationships.  
Therefore, the above studies relate the national culture of secrecy to the 
disclosure of information, and in a more general context to information asymmetry 
problems. However, none of them investigates whether and how secrecy influences 
stock price synchronicity. This is surprising, given the central role of information 
dissemination in the studies on stock price synchronicity discussed in both the 
introduction and in Section 2.1., and we aim to close this gap in the literature.   
 
3. Empirical framework  
In the sub-sections that follow we first define the data selection criteria and the variables 




(sub-section 3.2). Further information about the variables and their sources is available 
in the Appendix.  
 
3.1. Data selection 
Our dataset includes stock return data for all MSCI Developed and Emerging Markets. 
More precisely, for these countries, we download stock returns from Datastream (using 
the total return index) over the period 1990 to 2019. Then, we apply two criteria to filter 
our sample. First, we only include stocks that have at least 30 weeks of stock return 
data in a given year. Second, we exclude country-year observations in cases where the 
country has less than 25 stocks that meet the first criterion in that year. To account for 
the presence of outliers, we winsorize each firm’s stock returns at the 1% and the 99% 
levels, as in Francis et al. (2015). Our initial sample consists of 1,354 country-year 
observations.  
 
3.1.1. Stock price synchronicity 
To calculate the measure of stock price synchronicity, we follow Morck, et al. (2000), 
Jin and Myers (2006), and Eun et al. (2015). More specifically, R2 is obtained using the 
following expanded market model: 
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Returns on eq. (1) are on a weekly basis (Wednesday-to-Wednesday). We do so, in 
order to account for any calendar anomalies such as the Monday effect (An and Zhang, 
2013; Francis et al., 2015). In the equation, i denotes a firm index, j denotes a country 




of country j in week t of a year, and rm,j,t is the domestic market index return in the same 
time period.5 Further, the term rU.S.,t + ERj,t  stands for the U.S. market return, adjusted 
for changes in the local currency against the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, we include lags 
and leads to avoid thin trading issues (Dimson, 1979). Finally, in each year, we 
calculate country R2 as the average R2 of all firms in that country.  
Considering that the R2 obtained by eq. (1) is highly skewed and is within the 












=   − 
   (2) 
where Synchronicityj,t  is the stock price synchronicity of country j in year t, and R
2
j,t is 
the R2 obtained from eq. (1) for country j in year t.  
 
3.1.2. Indicator of the Culture of Secrecy  
Building on Gray (1988) and Hope et al. (2008) we construct the key independent 
variable of secrecy with the use of the following three dimensions of national culture 
from Hofstede (1980): uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and individualism.6  
Starting with the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, Gray (1988) 
argues in favour of a positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and secrecy. 
The underlying idea is that societies which are characterized by strong uncertainty will 
restrict the dissemination of information in order to avoid conflict, restrict the 
uncertainties of competition and preserve security (Gray, 1988; Gray and Vint, 1995; 
 
5 For each country j, we measure the domestic market index return using the Datastream Global Equity 
Indices. 
6 Uncertainty avoidance is defined as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
ambiguous or unknown situations” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 191). Power distance is defined as “the 
extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 61). Individualism (versus 
collectivism) “stands for a society in which the times between individuals are loose: everyone is expected 




Hope et al., 2008). The framework of Gray (1988) also points towards a positive 
association between a culture of power distance and secrecy, since people in high-
power distance societies are expected to restrict information to preserve power 
inequalities.7 Finally, secrecy is consistent with a preference for collectivism rather than 
individualism (Gray, 1988). This is due to different concerns for the interest of the 
group most closely and directly involved with the management and financing of the 
corporation rather than external parties like potential investors and the general public 
(Gray, 1988; Gray and Vint, 1995).8  
Based on the above conceptual framework, Hope et al. (2008) suggest the 
estimation of an indicator of the national culture secrecy to be used in empirical 
research. This is defined as the summation of uncertainty avoidance (UA) and power 
distance (PD) scores less the individualism (IND) score from Hofstede’s framework – 
i.e. SECRECY = UA + PD – IND. For the purposes of the present study we follow this 
approach, which has been widely employed in recent studies (Chen et al., 2017; 
Mazboudi and Hasan, 2018; Kanagaretnam et al., 2019; Pasiouras et al., 2020). All the 
scores for the national culture dimensions are from Hofstede Insights.  
 
3.1.3. Country-related disclosure characteristics  
To account for the institutional environment, we use the good government index 
constructed as in Eun et al. (2015). This is calculated by taking the summation of the 
 
7 Hofstede et al. (2010) also refer to differences that may relate to the dissemination of information. For 
example, they mention that in societies with a culture of large power-distance people read relatively few 
newspapers, as well as that  “scandals involving persons in power are expected, and so is the fact that 
these scandals will be covered” (p. 77). 
8 Along the same lines, Mazboudi and Hasan (2018) argue that “people in high individualistic societies, 
such as the U.K. and the U.S., are expected to be less secretive and are more willing to share information 
with external parties, other than related parties, as opposed to people in high collectivistic societies, 
such as Brazil and Mexico, who are more likely to restrict information to related parties or the social 




percentile ranks of the following two indices from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) Project: (i) government effectiveness, and (ii) control of 
corruption. In general, bad government has been associated with a lack of protection of 
private property, which in turn serves as proxy for more opaqueness, and shifts firm-
specific risk from outside investors to inside managers (Jin and Myers, 2006). Along 
these lines, Morck et al. (2000) suggest that in countries with weak investors’ protection 
from corporate insiders, problems like intercorporate income shifting could make firm-
specific information less useful to risk arbitrageurs, and therefore hinder its 
capitalization into stock prices.  
To account for the dissemination of information in the markets through the 
press, we control for the freedom of the press as in Kim et al. (2014). We use 
information from the Freedom House, which based on its annual Freedom of the Press 
Survey classifies countries in three groups. These are as follows: (i) Free - rated as 1, 
(ii) Partly Free - rated as 2, and (iii) Not Free - rated as 3. Hence, a higher score indicates 
lack of freedom of the press.  
We also control for the role of the diversity of analyst forecasts, accounting 
transparency and auditing activity - documented in Jin and Myers (2006) - with the use 
of two indicators. The first indicator is the diversity of analyst forecasts. This is 














=     (4) 
Where σi,j,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of the firm’s i earnings in 
year t, μi,j,t is the mean forecast of the firm’s i earnings in year t, Ni,j,t is the number of 




on the analysts’ earnings forecasts from the Institutional Broker’s Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). Each year t, for each country j, the country analyst diversity is the average 
analyst diversity of all firms in that country. We use the absolute value of mean earnings 
forecasts in eq. (4), because any negative values could underestimate the degree of the 
diversity of analysts’ opinions. 
The second indicator reflects the country-level perceptions on the strength of 
accounting and auditing standards. Data are from the Executive Opinion Survey of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The index that we use is based on the response to the 
following survey question “In your country, how strong are financial auditing and 
reporting standards?”. The respondents choose an answer in the range of 1 (extremely 
weak) to 7 (extremely strong), with the individual answers being aggregated at the 
country level by the WEF in the Global Competitiveness Report.  
 
3.1.4. Control variables 
We use various control variables suggested in past studies as potential drivers of stock 
price synchronicity. Morck et al. (2000) argue that higher synchronicity might simply 
reflect fewer traded stocks. To account for this, they include the logarithm of the 
number of listed stocks in each market in their estimations. We follow the same 
approach, which is also consistent with Jin and Myers (2006), Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2009) and Eun et al. (2015). We also use the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita 
to control for the overall economic development of a country (Morck et al., 2000; Jin 
and Myers, 2006; Doan et al., 2020) and its geographical size in square kilometers to 
account for the fact that smaller countries might have more geographically localized 
activities with implications for stock price comovement (Morck et al., 2000; Fernandes 




deviation of GDP growth, as in Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers (2006), Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2009), and Eun et al. (2015). Following the same studies, we also use the 
firm Herfindahl index and the industry Herfindahl index. Countries with relatively few 
and large firms or industries are expected to have high R2s. This is because having listed 
firms concentrated in a few industries means that their fundamentals could be highly 
correlated and their stock prices highly synchronous (Morck et al., 2000). Similarly, in 
markets dominated by a few very large firms, it is highly likely that the remaining listed 
firms will be suppliers or customers of these dominant firms, leading to a high degree 
of stock price synchronicity (Morck et al., 2000).   
 Firm fundamentals might also move together. To account for this, Morck et al. 
(2000) suggest the construction of an earnings co-movement index of the firms’ return 
on assets in each country. This index is constructed in way that is analogous to the R2 
of the stock price synchronicity, but it measures the synchronicity of firm fundamentals 
instead. Therefore, to calculate the earning co-movement index, we use the R2 of the 
following regression model: 
, , , , , , , ,i j t i j i t m j t i j tROA a b ROA = + +     (3) 
where ROAi,j,t is the return on assets (ROA) of firm i in country j at year t, and ROAm,j,t 
is the domestic market ROA at the same year. Each year, for every firm, the ROA 
regression is estimated using a five-year rolling window, as in Chan et al. (2013). 
Following Goldeng et al. (2008), we exclude observations if a firm’s ROA is higher 
than 100% or lower than ‒100%. The former case means that the firm’s profits were 
higher than its assets in a giver year, while the latter case means that the firm has lost 
all of its assets in a given year. For each year, the country R2 is measured at the average 
R2 of all firms in the country. Finally, we calculate the country ROA synchronicity as 




3.2. Methodology  
To address our main research question, we estimate the following panel regression 
model:  
, 1, 2, , 3, , ,j t j j j j j t j j t j tSynchronicity a b Secrecy b X b Z = + + + +   (5) 
where Synchronicityj,t  is the stock price synchronicity of country j in year t, Secrecyj is 
our measure of the culture of secrecy of country j, Xj,t is a vector of country-specific 
disclosure-related characteristics of country j at year t,  and Zj,t is a vector of control 
variables of country j at year t.   
 In our empirical setting, it is likely that the residuals are correlated in two ways. 
First, the residuals can be correlated across years within a country, and second, they 
can be correlated across countries within a year. One possible solution to address this 
concern is to use the standard approach of two-way clustering (country clustering and 
year clustering). However, as outlined by Petersen (2009), this approach may yield 
biased results, if the number of clusters is relatively small (usually less than fifty). To 
overcome this issue, we use the wild bootstrap method of Cameron et al. (2008). More 
precisely, in all our panel regressions, we estimate standard errors with country 
clustering and year cluster bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Baseline regressions   
Table 1 presents the list of the 49 countries of the sample, and the corresponding period 
that we use to measure stock price synchronicity. We also show information about the 
main independent variable of interest (i.e. Secrecy). Additionally, we present 
information about the four control variables that relate to the dissemination of 




diversity and good government index. It should be noted that due to data availability, 
information about the accounting standards variable is restricted to the period 2006 - 
2019. Similarly, information about the lack of press freedom is restricted to the period 
2001 -2016. Table 2 presents summary statistics about all variables, and Table 3 shows 
the correlation coefficients.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 to 3 Around Here] 
 
 Table 4 shows our baseline regressions. In the first columns we present 
benchmark regressions, like the ones estimated in Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers 
(2006), and Eun et al. (2015).  In more detail, in Column 1 we show the regression of 
stock price synchronicity on economy structural variables. These estimations reveal 
that the deviation of GDP growth and the synchronicity of the return on assets are both 
positively associated with stock price synchronicity. In Column 2, we add the good 
government index. Consistent with the results in Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers 
(2006), and Eun et al. (2015) we find the index to be negatively associated with stock 
price co-movement. In Column 3 we add the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Given 
that this is considered a measure of opaqueness (Jin and Myers, 2006) we would expect 
it to be positively associated with stock price synchronicity. While it enters the 
regression with the expected sign, its impact is not statistically significant, a finding 
that is consistent with the one in Eun et al. (2015).  
 In column 4 we present the main specification of interest of the present study, 
which includes the indicator of cultural secrecy. Consistent with our hypothesis, it 
enters the regression with a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 




Secrecy increases Synchronicity by 11%. Therefore, we document that stock price 
synchronicity is higher in countries characterized by a culture of opaqueness.  
Table 4 also presents the estimations with the inclusion of the control variables 
for the accounting and auditing standards (columns 5 and 6) and the lack of freedom of 
the press (columns 7 and 8).9 Consistent with our expectations, the results in column 5 
show that stock synchronicity is lower in countries with better accounting and auditing 
standards that enhance the dissemination of information in the market. However, the 
effect of accounting and auditing standards becomes insignificant when we add the 
indicator of the culture of secrecy in column 6. Similarly, the lack of press freedom is 
positively associated with stock price synchronicity and statistically significant at the 
1% level in column 7. However, once we add the culture of secrecy in the specification 
in Column 8, the statistical significance of the freedom of press indicator drops at the 
10% level. This possibly reflects that the culture of secrecy that is a deep-rooted and 
more general indicator of opaqueness, is a more important driver of stock synchronicity 
than the accounting and auditing standards or the freedom of press.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
 
4.2. Robustness tests  
4.2.1. Using alternative methodological approaches 
In this section we present the results obtained with three alternative estimation 
techniques.  First, we re-estimate the specifications of Table 4 with the use of a balanced 
sample. Therefore, we restrict the sample to those countries for which we have 
 
9 We do not include these in the baseline regression in Column 4 because of the limited time period for 




information for all the years of the analysis. We do so, as the clustered standard errors 
are more reliable in a balanced sample. Second, as in Jin and Myers (2006), we rely on 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. We present these results in Tables 5 and 6. In both 
cases, the main results hold, as, we continue to find a positive association between the 
indicator of the culture of secrecy and stock price synchronicity.  
 At this point, we should note that in Table 6, more variables enter the 
regressions with statistically significant coefficients compared to Tables 4 and 5. This 
is probably due to the fact that the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach addresses the 
within-year correlation of residuals, but the predicted standard errors could be biased if 
the residuals are also correlated across countries within a year (Petersen, 2009). For this 
reason, the results of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions should be interpreted with 
caution.  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 Around Here] 
 
 Third, we account for endogeneity. The results presented so far are unlikely to 
be driven by reverse causality. We have no reasons to believe that stock price 
synchronicity could have an impact on something as deep-rooted as culture. Second, 
the inclusion of various control variables used in earlier studies, mitigates further 
potential concerns about omitted variables. However, at this stage we also address this 
issue in a more formal way, at least to the extent that it is possible with the data in hand. 
Therefore, we rely on a 2SLS IV regression with the use of exogenous instruments. 
While it is not possible to completely rule out endogeneity, these estimations should 
enhance confidence in the reported findings. We present tests with three instruments 




satisfying the exogeneity requirement, and (ii) correlated with the culture of secrecy, 
therefore satisfying the relevance requirement.  
Following Pasiouras et al. (2020) we use religion as the first instrument. We 
have no reasons to believe that religion has a direct impact on stock synchronicity, 
unless it is through other country-specific attributes like culture. As outlined in 
Pasiouras et al. (2020) scholars from the fields of religion, sociology, and anthropology 
have all investigated secrecy as a key element of religiosity, with elements of secrecy 
being central in the understanding of many elements of religion beliefs, experiences 
and practices in religious communities (Duncan, 2006).10 We consider the total share 
of religion adherence in each country in 1900 from Barro and McClearly (2003). In 
more detail we use the summation of the proportion of adherence to one of the following 
ten religions: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Other Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, 
Buddhism, Other Eastern religions, Other religions. Thus, we ignore the proportion of 
the population with no adherence (nonreligions, atheists).  
The second instrument that we use is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
country was a British colony.11 Nash and Patel (2019) refer to several scholars who 
suggest that colonization by the British, compared to colonization by other European 
powers, had profound social implications impacting various attributes like self-
determination and self-assertion (Licht et al., 2005, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Along the same lines, the results of Ashkanasy et al. (2002) show that the Anglo Cluster 
 
10 Religion has been used widely as an instrument of individual indicators of national culture. See for 
example Li et al. (2013), El Ghoul and Zheng (2016), Boubakri et al. (2017), Gaganis et al. (2020). Carl 
et al. (2004) and Hofstede et al. (2010) also discuss how religion could relate to individual indicators of 
national culture, like uncertainty avoidance and power distance. See also Scheid (2006) and Teeuwen 
(2006) for a discussion of the Japanese Middle Ages where secrecy in religion spread beyond religion to 
become a “culture of secrecy” across various segments of the society.    
11 Information on British colonies is obtained from the ICOW colonial history data set (Hensel, 2014), 





of former British colonies is characterized by an individualistic performance 
orientation. Furthermore, Nash and Patel (2019) outline various studies discussing that 
in “extractive” states, typically established by Latin nations, the colonial authorities 
designed institutions to consolidate power and facilitate the exploitation of the 
indigenous population and the natural resources (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly 
and Levine, 2003), resulting in a culture of high power distance. In contrast, the British 
were inclined mostly towards the foundation of “settlement colonies” where the 
development of a robust middle class resulted in the wider distribution of power and 
wealth, and a culture of lower power distance (Nash and Patel, 2019). Finally, 
Ashkanasy et al. (2002) reveal that the Anglo cluster is one of only three clusters that 
believe that there should be less uncertainty avoidance than there is in practice. All in 
all, it seems that being a British colony should be associated with a lower score for our 
indicator of cultural secrecy.   
The third instrument that we use is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index 
from La Porta et al. (1999), which reflects the degree of heterogeneity in a country in 
terms of ethnicities and language. Our approach to instrument culture with a 
fractionalization index is consistent with Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Siegel et al. (2013), 
Li et al. (2013), Gaganis et al. (2020), among others.  
We present these results in Table 7. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the results of 
the first stage regression with secrecy being the dependent variable and religion 
(column 1), British colony (column 3), and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (column 5) 
being independent variables. These first-stage regressions also include all the control 
variables of the second stage regressions. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the corresponding 
second-stage regressions with the use of the instrumented cultural variable. In all the 




Since we use the instruments one at a time, the regressions are always exactly identified. 
The results hold. Secrecy continues to be positively associated to stock price 
synchronicity when we address endogeneity concerns with the use of exogenous 
instruments.  
[Insert Table 7 Around Here] 
 
4.2.2. Using an alternative indicator of secrecy  
As discussed earlier, Gray (1988) also suggests that there could be a negative, albeit 
less important link between masculinity and secrecy.12 The underlying idea is that more 
caring societies (i.e. higher femininity / lower masculinity) are more likely to be more 
open especially as it concerns socially related information. Based on this, Hope et al. 
(2008) also perform a robustness test with the use of an alternative indicator, calculated 
as SECRECY2 = UA + PD – IND – MAS. Consistent with this and other empirical 
studies (Chen et al., 2017; Mazboudi and Hasan, 2018), we re-estimate the 
specifications of Table 4 with the use of this alternative indicator of secrecy. The results 
remain the same.13  
 
4.3. Further analysis 
In this section we attempt to shed some further light on our findings, by: (i) offering an 
explanation as for the mechanisms through which the culture of secrecy influences 
stock price synchronicity, and (ii) disaggregating our measure of stock price 
synchronicity into an indicator of market-wide variation and firm-specific variation.  
 
12 Masculinity, the opposite of femininity, “stands for a society in which emotional gender roles are 
clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are 
supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede et al., 2010; p. 
519) 





4.3.1. Possible mechanisms on the influence of the culture of secrecy  
So far, we have presented robust evidence that a culture of secrecy is associated with 
higher stock price synchronicity. Motivated by earlier findings on the role of good 
government (Morck et al., 2000; Jin and Myers, 2006; Eun et al., 2015), accounting 
disclosures (Jin and Myers, 2006), and the freedom of press ( Kim et al., 2014) in 
explaining stock price synchronicity, we examine whether cross-country differences 
across these dimensions are due to differences in the culture of secrecy.  
As we discussed earlier, existing evidence has already documented an 
association between accounting disclosures and a culture of secrecy (e.g. Gray and Vint, 
1995). Furthermore, there are various reasons for which a culture of secrecy can be 
negatively with the index of good government used in our study. First, the literature 
suggests that there exists a correlation between a lack of transparency and high levels 
of corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Bauhr and Grimes, 2017).14 Second, earlier 
studies establish a link between various cultural dimensions and corruption (Husted, 
1999; Seleim and Bontis, 2009).15 Third, transparency is also useful in verifying the 
terms of the rules and the identifies of the decisions makers, hence enhancing scrutiny 
and monitoring. In turn, this should have implications for government effectiveness 
because of accountability. Finally, evidence suggests that there exists an association 
between cultural dimensions, like individualism, and government effectiveness 
(Porcher, 2021).  
 
14 Kolstad and Wiig (2009), outline various reason for this. Among other things they mention that a lack 
of transparency: (i) makes corruption less risky and more attractive, (ii) makes it harder to use incentives 
to make public officials act cleanly, (iii) makes it hard to select the most honest and efficient people for 
public sector positions or as contract partners, (iv) makes cooperation more difficult to sustain, and 
opportunistic rent-seeking more likely. 
15 For example, Husted (1999) argues that power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity should 
be positively related to corruption, while the opposite should hold in the case of individualism. See 




 Table 8 presents the results with the use of the good government index (column 
1), accounting and auditing standards (column 2), and the lack of the freedom of press 
(column 3) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the indicator of 
the culture of secrecy and the control variables used in Table 4. As expected, the 
coefficient of secrecy is negative in the case of the good government index and the 
accounting and auditing standards, and positive in the case of the lack of press freedom. 
Thus, cross-country heterogeneity across these attributes can be explained by deep-
rooted cultural characteristics formed long time ago. This also explains why the 
inclusion of the indicator of culture of secrecy in the regressions of stock synchronicity 
drives out the significance of these standard variables used in earlier research.    
 
[Insert Table 8 Around Here] 
 
4.3.2. Secrecy, market-specific and firm-specific variations 
A high R2 can reflect low levels of firm-specific variation or high levels of market-
specific variation or both. Therefore, following Morck et al. (2000), we decompose our 
stock price synchronicity measure into market-specific variation and firm-specific 
variation. More precisely, the market-specific variation is the average explained sum of 
squares as measured by eq. (1), while the firm-specific variation is the average residual 
sum of squares as measured by eq. (1). In our regressions, we use the natural logarithm 
of these sub-indices as the dependent variable.16 
Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of market-specific variation, and in columns 4 to 6, the 
 
16 We do not apply the logistic transformation of eq. (2) in this case, as both variables are not bounded 




dependent variable is the natural logarithm of firm-specific variation. The coefficient 
of Secrecy is negative in all six models. However, in the case of market-specific 
variation, Secrecy is significant at the 5% level only in models 2 and 3, while in the 
case of firm-specific variation, Secrecy is significant at the 1% level in all three models. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of its coefficient suggests that Secrecy reduces firm-
specific variation more than market-specific variation. This result indicates that firms 
operating in more secretive societies are less informative, a fact which reduces the 
amount of firm-specific information impounded in the stock prices. Therefore, the 
culture of secrecy increases stock price synchronicity mainly by decreasing firm-
specific variations.  
 
[Insert Table 9 Around Here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
The information environment of the market has a central role in the stock price 
synchronicity literature. Existing studies focus on various mechanisms like the opacity 
of the financial statements, the cost of information collection, and the dissemination of 
information. We present robust empirical evidence of an association between a national 
culture of secrecy and stock price synchronicity across counties, suggesting that the 
lack of transparency reduces the ability of stock prices to incorporate and reflect firm-
specific information. These results are robust to the inclusion of various control 
variables in the regressions, the use of a slightly different indicator of culture of secrecy, 
and alternative regression techniques. Additionally, we find that a culture of secrecy 




 Another interesting observation is that the inclusion of the culture of secrecy 
indicator in the regressions drives out the significance of the accounting and auditing, 
lack of press of freedom, and government effectiveness suggested in earlier studies. 
Further regressions reveal that that cultural values of secrecy affect all these country-
level attributes. Overall, our results support the findings of a growing number of studies 
that reveal that cultural values with deep roots in societies affect the decision-making 
and the characteristics of financial markets. For example, Chui et al. (2010) conclude 
that individualism is positively associated with trading volume, volatility, and the 
magnitude of momentum profits. More recent evidence by Ashraf (2021) reveals that 
the national-level uncertainty avoidance moderates the stock markets’ reaction to the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  The findings of these studies combined with our results could 
have implications for practitioners when constructing global portfolios of securities.  
 Our study is not without its limitations. For example, endogeneity may cloud 
our findings. It should be noted that national culture changes very slowly over time and 
perceptions over secretiveness depend on personal attributes that are deeply rooted into 
societal characteristics. Still, one may argue that major prior events related to the 
country’s financial market could affect perceptions over social norms leading to reverse 
causality (Mourouzidou-Damtsa et al., 2019). A more important concern in our context 
relates to omitted variables influencing our results. We first attempted to account for 
this by controlling for a wide range of country-level determinants of stock price 
synchronicity used in earlier studies. Then we used a more formal way to address 
endogeneity with a two-stage least squares regression and exogenous instruments. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that we cannot completely mitigate endogeneity concerns in 
our setting. Therefore, future studies could use propensity score and difference-in-
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R2 Country R2 measured as the average R2 of each firm in the country on an annual basis. 
Synchronicity The logistic transformation of R2. 
Secrecy Measure of the culture of secrecy based on Hope et al. (2008).  This is defined as the summation 
of uncertainty avoidance (UA) and power distance (PD) scores less the individualism (IND) 
score from Hofstede’s framework. 
Accounting standards An indicator of each country's strength of accounting and auditing standards. Data are from the 
World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey. 
Lack of free press An inverse indicator of each country's freedom of press, based on the Freedom House annual 
Freedom of the Press Survey. 
Analyst diversity Country average diversity as the average analyst diversity of each firm in the country on an 
annual basis. Firm's analyst diversity is measured as the standard deviation of the analysts’ 
forecasts of the firm's earnings, normalized by the absolute value of mean forecast, and the 
divided by the square root of the number of analysts following the firm. Data on analysts’ 
forecasts are collected from I/B/E/S. 
Good government  The sum of the percentile ranks of two indices from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) Project: (i) government effectiveness, and (ii) control of corruption.  
St.dev (GDP growth) The standard deviation of the country's GDP growth for the period 1990-2019. 
Ln(GDP per capita) The natural logarithm of the GDP per capita on an annual basis. 
Ln(size) The natural logarithm of each country's geographical size in square kilometers  
Ln(number of stocks) The natural logarithm of the number of listed stocks in each country on an annual basis. 
Firm HHI Firm concentration ratio, as measured by the firm Herfindahl index on an annual basis. 
Industry HHI Industry concentration ratio, as measured by the industry Herfindahl index on an annual basis. 
ROA R2 Each country's earnings co-movement index is measured by the average R2 of each firm in the 
country on annual basis. 







R2 and disclosure-related country characteristics 
This table shows the list of the 49 countries of our sample, and the corresponding period we use to measure stock price 
synchronicity. R2 is the country’s average R2 obtained from eq. (1), Secrecy is the cultural measures of Hofstede, 
Accounting standards is the average measure of Accounting standards for each country, Lack of free press is the rating of 
each country’s freedom of press, Analyst diversity is the average diversity of analysts’ forecasts of the countries’ firm 
earnings, and Good government is the average measure of each country’s institutional environment. 









Argentina  1994-2019 0.367 89 3.925 2.000 0.356 1.016 
Australia 1990-2019 0.237 ‒1 6.034 1.000 0.163 1.882 
Austria 1990-2019 0.296 26 5.923 1.000 0.134 1.861 
Belgium 1990-2019 0.277 84 5.705 1.000 0.181 1.812 
Brazil  1995-2019 0.282 107 4.853 2.000 0.248 1.059 
Canada  1990-2019 0.269 7 6.173 1.000 0.200 1.904 
Chile  1990-2019 0.269 126 5.420 1.250 0.123 1.742 
China 1995-2019 0.445 90 4.448 3.000 0.118 0.983 
Columbia  1992-2019 0.297 134 4.547 2.250 0.132 0.909 
Czech Republic  1994-2007 0.246 73 5.126 1.000 0.170 1.465 
Denmark  1990-2019 0.269 ‒33 5.714 1.000 0.153 1.971 
Egypt 1997-2019 0.346 125 4.397 2.750 0.178 0.711 
Finland  1990-2019 0.323 29 6.358 1.000 0.166 1.967 
France  1990-2019 0.267 83 5.666 1.000 0.163 1.770 
Germany  1990-2019 0.273 33 5.756 1.000 0.192 1.862 
Greece  1990-2019 0.349 125 4.426 1.313 0.228 1.363 
Hong Kong  1990-2019 0.306 72 6.149 1.692 0.138 1.824 
Hungary  1995-2019 0.295 48 4.933 1.375 0.096 1.469 
India  1990-2019 0.251 69 4.963 2.000 0.096 0.971 
Indonesia  1990-2019 0.274 112 4.508 2.000 0.154 0.651 
Ireland  1990-2019 0.296 ‒7 5.162 1.000 0.129 1.814 
Israel  1990-2019 0.276 40 5.691 1.250 0.130 1.658 
Italy  1990-2019 0.365 49 4.208 1.750 0.189 1.389 
Japan  1990-2019 0.360 100 5.548 1.000 0.157 1.746 
Malaysia  1990-2019 0.348 110 5.502 3.000 0.119 1.417 
Mexico  1990-2019 0.305 133 4.817 2.438 0.242 0.996 
Netherlands  1990-2019 0.325 11 6.035 1.000 0.122 1.937 
New Zealand  1990-2019 0.253 ‒8 6.260 1.000 0.084 1.933 
Norway  1990-2019 0.292 12 6.181 1.000 0.258 1.951 
Pakistan  1993-2019 0.269 111 4.224 2.813 0.146 0.475 
Peru  1994-2019 0.245 135 4.937 1.938 0.208 0.927 
Philippines  1990-2019 0.282 106 4.990 1.875 0.121 0.893 
Poland  1995-2019 0.298 101 4.877 1.063 0.147 1.454 
Portugal  1990-2019 0.300 135 4.712 1.000 0.166 1.681 
Qatar 2006-2019 0.417 148 5.720 3.000 0.055 1.444 
Russia 2001-2019 0.306 149 3.928 2.938 0.352 0.571 
Saudi Arabia 2006-2019 0.473 150 5.220 3.000 0.102 1.076 
Singapore  1990-2019 0.323 62 6.203 3.000 0.125 1.970 
South Africa  1990-2019 0.260 33 6.229 1.500 0.111 1.405 
South Korea  1990-2019 0.299 127 4.686 1.438 0.208 1.462 
Spain  1990-2019 0.346 92 4.827 1.000 0.130 1.684 
Sweden  1990-2019 0.301 ‒11 6.068 1.000 0.201 1.958 
Switzerland  1990-2019 0.304 24 5.920 1.000 0.133 1.934 
Taiwan  1990-2019 0.396 110 5.492 1.000 0.167 1.552 
Thailand  1990-2019 0.320 108 5.006 2.313 0.194 1.090 
Turkey  1990-2019 0.409 114 4.506 2.250 0.215 1.105 
United Arab Emirates 2004-2019 0.327 145 5.450 3.000 0.097 1.536 
United Kingdom  1990-2019 0.259 ‒19 5.954 1.000 0.106 1.879 






This table presents the summary statistics for the variables of our sample. Our sample consists of country-year observations 
of 49 countries during the period 1990 to 2019. R2 is obtained from eq. (1), and Synchronicity is the logistic transformation 
of R2. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Variable N Mean St.dev. 25th Median 75th 
R2 1,354 0.306 0.075 0.253 0.288 0.337 
Synchronicity 1,354 ‒0.841 0.341 ‒1.083 ‒0.904 ‒0.677 
Secrecy 1,354 70.726 52.527 26.000 84.000 112.000 
Accounting standards 674 5.287 0.737 4.725 5.351 5.933 
Lack of free press  759 1.642 0.781 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Analyst diversity 1,311 0.162 0.139 0.081 0.123 0.193 
Good government  1,354 1.496 0.434 1.113 1.641 1.872 
St.dev (GDP growth) 1,354 2.688 1.140 1.805 2.422 3.407 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1,354 9.742 1.149 9.028 10.095 10.645 
Ln(size) 1,354 12.662 2.125 11.321 12.762 14.009 
Ln(number of stocks) 1,354 5.639 1.190 4.779 5.416 6.551 
Firm HHI 1,353 0.060 0.062 0.026 0.045 0.076 
Industry HHI 1,353 0.124 0.073 0.077 0.110 0.151 
ROA R2 1,337 0.377 0.102 0.306 0.370 0.437 











This table presents pairwise correlation between the variables of our sample. Our sample consists of country-year observations of 49 countries during the period 1990 to 2019. 
R2 is obtained from eq. (1), and Synchronicity is the logistic transformation of R2. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols b and a denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
R2 (1) 1.000                
Synchronicity (2) 0.997a 1.000               
Secrecy (3) 0.268a 0.271a 1.000              
Accounting standards (4) ‒0.145a ‒0.141a ‒0.584a 1.000             
Lack of free press (5)  0.226a 0.218a 0.581a ‒0.425a 1.000            
Analyst diversity (6) 0.083a 0.087a 0.099a ‒0.170a ‒0.027 1.000           
Good government (7) ‒0.135a ‒0.133a ‒0.662a 0.769a ‒0.646a ‒0.122a 1.000          
St.dev (GDP growth) (8) 0.239a 0.244a 0.398a ‒0.358a 0.465a 0.153a ‒0.328a 1.000         
Ln(GDP per capita) (9) ‒0.045 ‒0.040 ‒0.546a 0.592a ‒0.524a ‒0.037 0.863a ‒0.166a 1.000        
Ln(size) (10) ‒0.070a ‒0.083a 0.104a ‒0.373a 0.150a 0.098a ‒0.458a ‒0.016 ‒0.382a 1.000       
Ln(number of stocks) (11) ‒0.124a ‒0.142a ‒0.146a 0.140a ‒0.045 ‒0.086a 0.104a ‒0.305a ‒0.004 0.192a 1.000      
Firm HHI (12) 0.139a 0.143a ‒0.016 ‒0.052 ‒0.047 ‒0.008 ‒0.061b 0.091a ‒0.060b ‒0.105a ‒0.504a 1.000     
Industry HHI (13) 0.197a 0.200a 0.162a ‒0.167a 0.049 0.031 ‒0.177a 0.206a ‒0.145a ‒0.081a ‒0.517a 0.825a 1.000    
ROA R2 (14) 0.191a 0.188a 0.106a ‒0.080b 0.039 0.165a ‒0.123a 0.061b ‒0.176a 0.033 ‒0.029 0.032 0.085a 1.000   







This table presents panel regression results for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. The sample consists of 
country-year observations. The dependent variable in all models is the stock price synchronicity, which is the logistic 
transformation of R2 as measured by eq. (1). All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors with country clustering and year 
cluster bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Secrecy     0.002***  0.001**  0.002*** 
    (2.85)  (2.07)  (2.97) 
Analyst diversity   0.043 0.037 0.065 0.058 0.098 0.040 
   (0.41) (0.35) (0.30) (0.26) (0.62) (0.26) 
Good government    ‒0.279** ‒0.289** ‒0.158     
  (‒2.24) (‒2.27) (‒1.15)     
Accounting standards     ‒0.078** ‒0.044   
     (‒2.13) (‒1.01)   
Lack of free press       0.122*** 0.090* 
       (2.41) (1.80) 
St.dev (GDP growth) 0.061*** 0.044* 0.043* 0.034 0.005 ‒0.008 0.013 0.001 
 (2.50) (1.78) (1.75) (1.44) (0.21) (‒0.35) (0.51) (0.06) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.008 0.089* 0.094* 0.092* 0.058* 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 
 (0.41) (1.88) (1.98) (1.98) (2.11) (2.83) (2.63) (3.75) 
Ln(size) ‒0.009 ‒0.020 ‒0.022 ‒0.013 0.005 0.011 0.007 0.011 
 (‒0.78) (‒1.60) (‒1.80) (‒1.12) (0.36) (0.82) (0.42) (0.74) 
Ln(number of stocks) 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.009 ‒0.029 ‒0.024 ‒0.009 0.001 
 (0.14) (0.40) (0.24) (0.30) (‒0.87) (‒0.74) (‒0.27) (0.02) 
Firm HHI ‒0.274 ‒0.096 ‒0.231 0.209 ‒1.054 ‒0.514 ‒0.798 ‒0.271 
 (‒0.35) (‒0.12) (‒0.32) (0.29) (‒1.36) (‒0.644) (‒0.82) (‒0.31) 
Industry HHI 0.850 0.675 0.575 0.292 1.136 0.760 1.108 0.811 
 (1.60) (1.28) (0.97) (0.50) (1.64) (1.10) (1.11) (0.94) 
ROA synchronicity 0.122*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.065 0.071 
 (4.00) (4.42) (3.82) (3.94) (3.36) (3.45) (1.48) (1.61) 
Constant ‒1.019*** ‒1.247*** ‒1.217*** ‒1.582*** ‒0.862* ‒1.452*** ‒1.893*** ‒2.329*** 
 (‒2.57) (‒2.92) (‒2.87) (‒3.81) (‒1.72) (‒2.41) (‒3.82) (‒4.75) 
N 1,337 1,337 1,303 1,303 662 662 739 739 








Baseline regressions on a balanced panel 
This table repeats the baseline regressions of Table 4 for a balanced sample of 336 country-year observations. The 
dependent variable in all models is the stock price synchronicity, which is the logistic transformation of R2 as measured by 
eq. (1). All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
level. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors with country clustering and year cluster bootstrapping with 
1,000 replications. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Secrecy    0.002**  0.002**  0.001* 
    (2.29)  (2.57)  (1.82) 
Analyst diversity   ‒0.139 ‒0.111 ‒0.030 ‒0.023 0.104 0.064 
   (‒0.55) (‒0.45) (‒0.12) (‒0.09) (0.38) (0.23) 
Good government    ‒0.434*** ‒0.457*** ‒0.327*     
  (‒2.62) (‒2.90) (‒2.06)     
Accounting standards     ‒0.057 ‒0.026   
     (‒1.27) (‒0.55)   
Lack of free press       0.136** 0.098 
       (2.16) (1.42) 
St.dev (GDP growth) 0.013 ‒0.009 ‒0.009 ‒0.021 0.008 ‒0.012 ‒0.031 ‒0.036 
 (043) (‒029) (‒0.20) (‒0.67) (0.23) (‒0.39) (‒0.85) (‒0.96) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.044 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.063 0.101** 0.099** 0.121*** 
 (1.11) (3.13) (3.20) (3.31) (1.60) (2.53) (2.35) (2.90) 
Ln(size) 0.016 ‒0.001 ‒0.000 0.009 0.012 0.020** 0.022 0.025 
 (1.04) (‒0.04) (‒0.02) (0.55) (0.73) (1.18) (1.27) (1.49) 
Ln(number of stocks) ‒0.039 ‒0.024 ‒0.023 ‒0.021 ‒0.038 ‒0.030 ‒0.049 ‒0.040 
 (‒0.97) (‒0.81) (‒0.60) (‒0.54) (‒0.94) (‒0.76) (‒1.23) (‒0.50) 
Firm HHI ‒1.625 ‒1.099 ‒1.098 ‒0.446 ‒1.485 ‒0.563 ‒1.722 ‒0.921 
 (‒1.72) (‒1.21) (‒1.23) (‒0.46) (‒1.55) (‒0.56) (‒1.48) (‒0.74) 
Industry HHI 1.706 1.015 1.026 0.506 1.469 0.709 1.739 1.042 
 (1.91) (1.10) (1.11) (052) (1.54) (0.73) (1.40) (0.82) 
ROA synchronicity 0.106 0.080 0.082 0.091 0.102 0.107 0.100 0.104 
 (1.12) (0.93) (0.97) (1.10) (1.24) (1.31) (1.21) (1.27) 
Constant ‒1.285** ‒1.837*** ‒1.885*** ‒2.227*** ‒1.103 ‒1.836*** ‒1.986*** ‒2.285*** 
 (‒1.95) (‒2.83) (‒2.71) (‒3.20) (‒1.51) (‒2.35) (‒2.84) (‒3.23) 
N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 









This table present Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. The sample 
consists of country-year observations. The dependent variable in all models is the stock price synchronicity, which is the 
logistic transformation of R2 as measured by eq. (1). All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West standard errors with lags 
up to 6 years. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 
2-tail test. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) (7) (8) 
Secrecy    0.002***  0.001***  0.002*** 
    (6.41)  (4.64)  (13.45) 
Analyst diversity   ‒0.077 ‒0.126* ‒0.098 ‒0.110 ‒0.005 ‒0.097 
   (‒1.08) (‒2.01) (‒1.08) (‒1.03) (‒0.10) (‒1.74) 
Good government    ‒0.342*** ‒0.407*** ‒0.251***     
  (‒6.61) (‒5.73) (‒5.25)     
Accounting standards     ‒0.112*** ‒0.084***   
     (‒3.82) (‒3.18)   
Lack of free press        0.123*** 0.098*** 
       (5.69) (6.02) 
St.dev (GDP growth) 0.061*** 0.045* 0.048** 0.045* 0.001 ‒0.012*** 0.012 0.003 
 (3.17) (2.03) (2.06) (1.73) (0.17) (‒4.14) (0.41) (0.10) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.008 0.110*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.076*** 0.102*** 0.075*** 0.109*** 
 (0.55) (4.05) (5.48) (6.92) (8.11) (19.16) (4.03) (7.65) 
Ln(size) ‒0.011 ‒0.022** ‒0.022** ‒0.012 0.004 0.010* 0.006 0.010 
 (‒0.97) (‒2.29) (‒2.30) (‒1.45) (0.85) (1.97) (0.63) (1.11) 
Ln(number of stocks) ‒0.004 0.008 ‒0.001 0.002 ‒0.027 ‒0.022 ‒0.013 ‒0.001 
 (‒0.24) (0.60) (‒0.10) (0.16) (‒1.60) (‒1.22) (‒0.61) (‒0.03) 
Firm HHI ‒0.850*** ‒0.497* ‒0.510** 0.092 ‒1.131*** ‒0.549*** ‒1.192*** ‒0.528* 
 (‒2.96) (‒1.85) (‒2.08) (0.30) (‒5.92) (‒3.11) (‒3.83) (‒2.11) 
Industry HHI 0.930*** 0.580*** 0.367 0.003 0.987*** 0.546*** 1.179*** 0.846*** 
 (4.88) (4.21) (1.66) (0.01) (6.05) (3.10) (4.71) (7.48) 
ROA synchronicity 0.126*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (5.44) (4.05) (4.08) (4.20) (3.52) (3.48) (3.71) (3.28) 
Constant ‒0.928*** ‒1.274*** ‒1.272*** ‒1.813*** ‒0.840*** ‒1.384*** ‒1.839*** ‒2.323*** 
 (‒4.38) (‒5.14) (‒4.62) (‒10.45) (‒4.87) (‒7.60) (‒12.45) (‒24.64) 
N 1,337 1,337 1,303 1,303 662 662 739 739 







This table presents 2SLS IV regressions for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. The sample consists of 
country-year observations. In the first stage regressions (models 1, 3, and 5), the dependent variable is Secrecy. The 
instruments are: Religion (model 1), British colony (model 3), and Ethnic fractionalization (model 5). In the second stage 
regressions (models 2, 4, and 6), the dependent variable is the stock price synchronicity, which is the logistic transformation 
of R2 as measured by eq. (1). All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors with country clustering and year cluster 
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Religion  British colony  Ethnic fractionalization 
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Instrument  3.591***   ‒0.028***   ‒0.068***  
  (3.88)   (‒2.15)   (‒2.37)  
Secrecy (Instrumented)   0.004**   0.004**   0.004** 
   (1.99)   (2.21)   (2.27) 
Analyst diversity  0.003 0.028  ‒0.10 0.030  0.017 0.030 
  (0.27) (0.26)  (‒0.79) (0.27)  (1.24) (0.30) 
Good government    ‒0.080*** 0.023  ‒0.068*** 0.080  ‒0.066*** 0.047 
  (‒2.69) (0.12)  (‒2.35) (0.42)  (‒2.46) (0.28) 
St.dev (GDP growth)  0.003 0.022  0.009*** 0.020  0.003 0.044 
  (0.55) (0.86)  (1.82) (0.78)  (0.40) (1.65) 
Ln(GDP per capita)  0.005 0.090*  ‒0.005** 0.089*  ‒0.016 0.103** 
  (0.53) (1.98)  (‒0.48) (1.89)  (‒1.51) (2.23) 
Ln(size)  ‒0.004** ‒0.002  ‒0.005*** ‒0.001  ‒0.006*** 0.004 
  (‒1.65) (‒0.01)  (‒2.10) (‒0.07)  (‒3.52) (0.23) 
Ln(number of stocks)  0.002 0.010  0.001 0.016  ‒0.000 0.010 
  (0.40) (0.35)  (0.22) (0.51)  (‒0.03) (0.32) 
Firm HHI  ‒0.160 0.814  ‒0.286*** 1.059  ‒0.305*** 0.572 
  (‒1.72) (0.87)  (‒2.96) (1.10)  (‒3.10) (0.59) 
Industry HHI  0.127 ‒0.095  0.175* ‒0.240  0.126 0.203 
  (1.36) (‒0.14)  (1.74) (‒0.37)  (1.21) (0.30) 
ROA synchronicity  0.001 0.120***  ‒0.001 0.123***  ‒0.004 0.129*** 
  (0.19) 3.96)  (‒0.21) (3.91)  (‒1.19) (4.32) 
Constant  ‒3.421*** ‒2.082***  0.251*** ‒2.236***  0.413*** ‒2.406*** 
  (‒3.62) (‒3.13)  (4.01) (‒3.22)  (4.15) (‒3.26) 
Underidentification test          
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  134.617   84.013   99.800  
Weak identification test          
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat  384.631   91.607   136.844  
N  1,303 1,303  1,273 1,273  1,238 1,238 






Disclosure-related country characteristics and culture of secrecy 
This table presents panel regression results for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. The sample consists 
of country-year observations. The dependent variable in models 1 is the good government index, in model 2 the measure 
of accounting standards, and in model 3 the countries’ rating on lack of free press. All independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors with country clustering and year cluster bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 




 Lack of free  
press 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Secrecy   ‒0.002***  ‒0.004***  0.004*** 
  (‒3.86)  (‒2.75)  (2.26) 
Analyst diversity  ‒0.149**  ‒0.951***  ‒0.392 
  (‒2.61)  (‒3.24)  (‒1.24) 
St.dev (GDP growth)  ‒0.037*  ‒0.077  0.239*** 
  (‒1.94)  (‒1.28)  (3.28) 
Ln(GDP per capita)  0.248***  0.247***  ‒0.244*** 
  (10.48)  (4.00)  (‒3.18) 
Ln(size)  ‒0.041***  ‒0.069***  ‒0.016 
  (‒5.59)  (‒2.93)  (‒0.34) 
Ln(number of stocks)  0.019***  0.006  0.083 
  (1.14)  (0.11)  (1.16) 
Firm HHI  ‒0.040  ‒0.753  2.408 
  (‒0.11)  (‒0.42)  (1.02) 
Industry HHI  ‒0.241  ‒1.312  ‒2.036 
  (‒0.53)  (‒0.63)  (‒0.81) 
ROA synchronicity  0.037**  ‒0.026  ‒0.038 
  (2.44)  (‒0.41)  (‒0.38) 
Constant  ‒0.202  4.529***  2.934*** 
  (‒0.63)  (4.57)  (2.54) 
N  1,303  662  739 







Regressions on the components of synchronicity 
This table presents panel regression results for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. The sample consists 
of country-year observations. The dependent variable in models 1-3 is the market-specific variation, which is the natural 
logarithm of the average explained sum of squares as measured by eq. (1). The dependent variable in models 4-6 is the 
firm-specific variation, which is the natural logarithm the average residual sum of squares as measured by eq. (1). All 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors with country clustering and year cluster bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Market-specific variation  Firm-specific variation 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Secrecy   ‒0.003 ‒0.004** ‒0.003**  ‒0.005*** ‒0.005*** ‒0.005*** 
  (‒1.59) (‒2.67) (‒1.94)  (‒2.23) (‒3.13) (‒2.63) 
Analyst diversity  1.205*** 1.380*** 1.114***  1.000*** 1.171*** 0.882*** 
  (7.12) (5.59) (5.58)  (5.90) (3.87) (4.11) 
Good government    0.038    0.156   
  (0.11)    (0.40)   
Accounting standards   ‒0.080    ‒0.036  
   (‒1.00)    (‒0.32)  
Lack of free press    ‒0.055    ‒0.159* 
    (‒0.68)    (‒1.57) 
St.dev (GDP growth)  0.110*** 0.081* 0.116***  0.081* 0.092* 0.125*** 
  (3.63) (1.94) (3.35)  (1.85) (1.55) (2.23) 
Ln(GDP per capita)  ‒0.143 ‒0.083 ‒0.123**  ‒0.199** ‒0.145* ‒0.216*** 
  (‒1.57) (‒1.35) (‒2.30)  (‒1.94) (‒1.78) (‒3.37) 
Ln(size)  ‒0.017 ‒0.033 ‒0.027  ‒0.006 ‒0.046* ‒0.041 
  (‒0.64) (‒1.52) (‒1.38)  (‒0.20) (‒1.65) (‒1.51) 
Ln(number of stocks)  0.251*** 0.225*** 0.250***  0.262*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
  (4.55) (3.83) (4.48)  (4.00) (3.92) (4.12) 
Firm HHI  2.242** 2.168** 2.394***  2.821* 3.956 4.036** 
  (2.51) (1.39) (1.81)  (2.04) (1.73) (1.95) 
Industry HHI  0.637 0.087 ‒0.051  ‒0.065 ‒1.442 ‒1.748 
  (0.63) (0.05) (‒0.03)  (‒0.06) (‒0.60) (‒0.85) 
ROA synchronicity  0.162*** 0.210* 0.161*  0.006 0.017 0.047 
  (2.68) (1.91) (1.91)  (0.09) (0.18) (0.55) 
Constant  ‒3.121*** ‒2.629*** ‒2.896***  ‒1.800** ‒1.340 ‒0.635 
  (‒4.19) (‒2.97) (‒3.30)  (‒2.03) (‒1.21) (‒0.60) 
N  1,303 662 739  1,303 662 739 
R2  0.245 0.239 0.227  0.282 0.327 0.320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
